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Abstract. Access Control (AC) is a well known mechanism that allows
access restriction to resources. Nevertheless, it does not provide notifi-
cation when a resource is retransmitted to an unauthorized third party.
To overcome this issue, one can use mechanisms such as Data Loss/Leak
Prevention (DLP) or Transmission Control (TC). These mechanisms are
based on policies that are defined by security experts. Unfortunately,
these policies can contradict existing AC rules, leading to security leak-
age (i.e. a legitimate user is allowed to send a resource to someone who
has no access rights in the AC).
In this article, we aim at creating TC policies that are compliant with
existing AC policies. To do so, we use a mapping mechanism that gener-
ates TC rules directly from existing AC policies. Thanks to the generated
rules, our solution can make inferences to improve existing AC and en-
hance security knowledge between infrastructures.
Key words: Security, Access Control, Security Policies, Transmission
Control, Transmission security, Data Loss Prevention, Data Leak Pre-
vention, Data Leakage
1 Introduction
To add security to an infrastructure, one can start by controlling access to certain
resources by using Access Control (AC) mechanisms. Unfortunately, traditional
AC mechanisms are not useful to notify and manage what can happen to the
resource once it is accessed. Indeed, a legitimate user can access then retransmit
(legitimately or not) the resource to an unauthorized third party. If the third
party does not have access to the resource in the AC, this retransmission can be
seen as a violation of AC, and thus, as a data leakage. To tackle this problem,
one can use Data Loss/Leak Prevention (DLP) or other Transmission Control
mechanisms (TC). Such mechanisms are based on policies that aim at monitoring
and notifying unauthorized resource transmission. DLP / TC are often used on
top of AC, leading security experts to manage both paradigms. This double
management can lead to data leakage.
Let us take an example. Imagine an AC policy containing a rule mentioning
that ”user Chris can access the resource docA.pdf” and a TC rule saying that
”Chris can send all pdf files”. If Chris accesses docA.pdf and wants to send it to
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Ana (who does not have access to docA.pdf in the AC), several remarks can be
made. First of all, the fact that Chris can access docA.pdf does not violate the
AC policy. Secondly, the fact that Chris sends docA.pdf to Ana does not violate
the TC policy. Nevertheless, the transmission will cause a violation of the AC
policy because Ana does not have access to docA.pdf.
This simple, but yet explicit example, shows that even if both AC and TC
policies are correct, TC rules can violate existing AC policies and consequently
lead to data leakage.
Our objective is to work with Transmission Control (TC) policies that
do not contradict the existing Access Control (AC) policies.
To do so, we propose a mechanism that generates TC policies based on
existing AC policies. Thanks to the generated TC policies, our solution
offers mechanisms that :
– help improving existing AC policies (M1);
– help integration and enhancement of security knowledge between infras-
tructures or companies (M2).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main
works related to access and transmission control. Section 3 describes the vocab-
ulary we are using. Section 4 details our solution. Section 5 presents the results
of our evaluation while section 6 concludes the paper and outlines future works.
2 Related Works
This section presents the main Access Control models and Data Loss/Leak Pre-
vention (DLP) notions. The last part of the section presents existing solutions
that aim at linking both AC and TC paradigms in common models or frame-
works.
2.1 Access Control Models (AC)
Access Control (AC) encompasses sets of controls to restrict access to certain
resources. Several contributions have been made to create efficient and fine-
grained AC mechanisms. The following subsections present the main AC models.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) MAC is a type of access control that
secures resources by assigning sensitivity labels on resources and comparing these
labels to the accreditation level a user is operating at. These levels are defined
and controlled by the system, independently of user operations and choices. MAC
is often used in confidential and military infrastructures. Famous models, such
as Bell-LaPadula [1] or Biba [2] are based on MAC principles.
3Discretionary Access Control (DAC) DAC allows users to determine and
set the permissions over all the resources they own. The main DAC models are
Access Control Lists (ACL) and Capability-based access control. Access Control
Lists [3] represent resource rights as a table of subjects mapped to their individ-
ual rights over the resource. ACLs are data-oriented and provide a straightfor-
ward and rather simple way of granting or denying access.
Capability-based [4] access is more subject-oriented. A capability is an unforge-
able token used to access a resource. It can be represented as a pair (x, r) where
x is the name of a resource and r is a set of access rights. Thus, subject’s capa-
bilities are stored with the subject. Systems such as Plessey System 250 [5] are
based on capabilities.
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) The paradigm behind RBAC [6] is
based on the notion of role. A role is a set of users that share common attributes
(for instance, a role ”Network-Staff” containing all the network engineers of a
company). In this model, users are members of one or several groups and this
membership gives them access to certain resources.
Attributes Based Access Control (ABAC) NIST defines ABAC as ”An
access control method where subjects requests to perform operations on objects are
granted or denied based on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned attributes
of the object, environment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in
terms of those attributes and conditions” [7]. Attributes can represent various
things about a subject (age, sex, etc.) or an object (resource security level, type,
etc.). Thus, ABAC can be seen as an extension of RBAC.
Policy Based Access Control (PBAC) Policy Based Access Control [8] al-
lows access rules to be defined and updated in a policy-oriented fashion. Policies
are sets of rules that can be combined to determine if an access is authorized or
not, depending on various attributes regarding the subject, object or environ-
ment. For these reasons, PBAC can be viewed as a standardization of ABAC for
companies or other governance oriented structures.
Traditional AC models offer an easy way to restrict access to resources. Nev-
ertheless, they do not tackle retransmission problems. To overcome this issue,
solutions have been proposed. These solutions include Data Loss/Leak Preven-
tion.
2.2 Data Loss/Leak Prevention (DLP)
This subsection presents the main notions of Data Loss/Leak Prevention1.
1 DLPs have been described in various terms, including Information Leak Detection
and Prevention (ILDP), Information Leak Prevention (ILP) or Content Monitoring
and Filtering (CMF). Nevertheless, DLP is the most commonly used name.
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Definition and classification DLPs have been described as ”systems that
monitors and enforce policies on fingerprinted data that are at rest (i.e. in stor-
age), in-motion (i.e. across a network) or in-use (i.e. during an operation) on
public or private computer/network.” [9].
Policy definition DLPs are based on policies. These policies can help secu-
rity experts defining fine-grained rules that help the DLP to detect and prevent
leakage (for instance: ”deny the transmission if data x is sent to user U1”). In-
dustrial DLPs, such as the one provided by Symantec2 or RSA3, offer graphical
user interfaces to generate these rules.
DLP can provide efficient TC mechanisms thanks to policies. As stated in the
introduction, such policies can be in contradiction with an existing AC, leading to
AC policy violations. To overcome this issue, one solution can be to combine both
Access Control and Transmission Control in an unified paradigm and define both
aspects at the same time. Such solutions are presented in the next subsections.
2.3 Unifying AC and TC
Several works have been proposed to unify AC and TC in common formalisms
or frameworks. By doing so, a security expert can define at the same time both
AC and TC policies, reducing the risk of contradiction. This subsection presents
the main works in the domain.
Usage Control (UCON) UCON [10] has proposed to add the notion of on-
going usage to AC. Based on the notions of Authorizations, Obligations and
Conditions, UCON offers a unified framework that covers traditional AC models
and enhance them to tackle prerequisites within network-connected environ-
ment. UCON has been followed by many works, tackling policy definition [11],
decentralized systems [12] or existing company mechanisms enforcement [13].
Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC) OrBAC defines a concep-
tual and industrial framework to meet the needs of information security. It covers
a lot of issues such as conflict detection [14] or interoperability and deployment
in companies Workflows [15]. In [16], OrBAC has been enhance to tackle infor-
mation flow control problematic.
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language - Data Loss Prevention
(XACML-DLP) XACML is a XML standard that defines a declarative AC.
In October 2014, a new version of XACML has been implemented. This version,
named XACML-DLP4, embeds both Access Control and Transmission Control
2 https://www.symantec.com/data-leak-prevention/
3 http://www.emc.com/security/rsa-data-loss-prevention.htm?
fromGlobalSelector
4 http://docs.oasis-open.org/xacml/xacml-3.0-dlp-nac/v1.0/csprd01/
xacml-3.0-dlp-nac-v1.0-csprd01.html
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Linking AC and TC in a common formalism allows security experts to define
at the same time both paradigms, reducing the risk of contradiction between
them. Nevertheless, these solutions do not use the existing AC. Moreover, they
cannot help enhancing the existing AC policies (M1) and ease the integration be-
tween companies thanks to inferences (M2). Following sections present a solution
providing such mechanisms.
3 Context and Vocabulary
This section gives information about the concepts and vocabulary we are using.
It first describes the scope of our study. Then, it presents a generic AC formalism
and sets some working hypothesis regarding the existing AC policies.
3.1 Scope of the study
In this paper, we have considered only 3 actions: Read, Read-Write, and no
access. Also, we have decided to represent subjects as individuals instead of
roles or groups. In term, we intend to broaden our solution to encompass more
sophisticated actions and subjects representation.
Concerning the validation of the generated TC policies, a checking mechanism
has been implemented to verify that generated TC rules are coherent with the
existing AC policies. In this article, we focus on the generation process itself, for
that reason, details about this validation mechanism are intentionally omitted.
3.2 Generic Access Control Model
To take into account the main AC models of the literature, we have been inspired
by [17] and more specifically [18] and [19] to represent a generic AC as a set of
rules (1). A rule is always composed of three fundamental things; Subject, Action
and Resource (2).
GenericAC =< σ1, σ2, ..., σn >,∀σ ∈ Rules (1)
σ =< s, a, r >, s ∈ Subject, a ∈ Action, r ∈ Resource (2)
Subjects, Actions and Resources are subsets of Entity (3). An entity can be
formalized has a unique identifier (for instance a name) and a set of param-
eters (i.e. attributes) (4). A parameter can represent for instance a role (ex:
role=”manager”) or an accreditation level (ex: ”accreditationLevel = ”3”). The
main properties of the identifier is that it cannot be empty (5) and it must be
unique (6).
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Fig. 1. Correspondences between the ABAC rule ”Managers can read all pdf files”
and the generic AC rules.
{Subject, Action,Resource} ⊂ Entity (3)
entity = {identifier,< p1, p2, ..., pn >} (4)
∀e ∈ Entity, e(identifier) 6= ∅ (5)
∀ei, ej ∈ Entity, ei(identifier) 6= ej(identifier) (6)
A parameter is a pair of key/value (7). Both key and value cannot be empty
(8). For a particular entity (ex: subject ”Bob”), two parameters cannot have the
same key (9).
parameter =< key, value > (7)
∀p ∈ Parameter, p(key) 6= p(value) 6= ∅ (8)
∀(pi, pj) ∈ P 2, pi(key) 6= pj(key) (9)
Thanks to this formalism, we consider that traditional AC models can be
represented. For instance, in the case of ABAC, a rule such as ”every Manager
can access all the pdf files in read mode” is equivalent to an enumeration of the
rules (i.e. Cartesian product) among set ”Manager” and set ”pdf” (see Fig. 1.).
We underline that such transformation can generate a huge amount of rules.
Nevertheless, conducting tests in Section 5 show that our model is efficient for
quite large sets of rules.
We make some hypothesis concerning the original AC. First of all, we consider
that the original AC does not contain contradictory rules (for instance, a subject
has both access and no access to a particular resource). Secondly, we consider
that the correspondence between the original AC and the generic AC rules is not
destructive, meaning that the semantic is conserved (no information is added,
modified or removed). Finally, we consider that the corresponding generic AC
can contain duplicate rules.
In this section, we have presented the generic model used by our solution. This
generic model has been defined in order to take into account several AC models
7such as traditional ACL, RBAC or ABAC. Working hypothesis have been made
concerning the correspondence with generic AC rules. The following section de-
scribes our contribution in detail.
4 Contribution
In this section, we present our model. The first subsections describe our Trans-
mission Control paradigm (4.1) and representation (4.2). Then, we present the
generation mechanism that transforms Access Control policies into Transmission
Control policies (4.3). The last subsections present a mechanism that notifies
possible AC improvement (4.4) and propose an example to illustrate that our
solution can ease integration and improve security knowledge between infras-
tructures (4.5).
4.1 Transmission Control List
Transmission Control model aims at answering the question: ”who can send
what to whom?”. To do so, we have defined a Transmission Control List (TCL),
formalized as a set of transmissions regarding a specific resource (10). Thus,
a specific TCL cannot describe transmission rights of more than one resource
(11). A transmission embeds the following elements: a source subject (i.e. the
sender), a destination subject (i.e. the receiver), the actions of the sender and
the receiver and a transmission type (12). A transmission type represents if a
transmission is authorized (TRANSMISSION AUTH) or if the transmission is
denied (TRANSMISSION DEN).
∀tcl ∈ TCL, tcl = {resource,< τ1, ..., τn >} (10)
∀tcl1, tcl2 ∈ TCL, tcl1(resource) 6= tcl2(resource) (11)
τ =< sender, receiver, senderAction, receiverAction, type >,
sender, receiver ∈ Subject,
senderAction, receiverAction ∈ Action, type ∈ TransmissionType
(12)
4.2 Representation
For the sake of understanding, we represent ACL and TCL as matrices. ACL
can be represented as a two-dimensional matrix, where columns represent re-
sources, rows represent subjects, and intersections represent the action that the
corresponding subject can perform on the corresponding resource (Fig. 2.a).
For a specific resource, the corresponding TCL can be represented as a two-
dimensional matrix, where rows represent senders, columns represent receivers,
and intersections represent the transmission type (ex: TRANSMISSION AUTH)
between the sender and the receiver (Fig. 2.b). We underline that actions of
senders and receivers are also conserved in the TCL, due to the TCL formalism
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(2.a) (2.b)
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of a generic ACL (2.a) and a corresponding TCL
(2.b)
defined in 4.1. We also underline that the only subjects that are present in the
corresponding TCL are the subjects with an explicit access right to this resource
(we call such subjects ”marked subjects”). Thus, the size of the TCL depends
on the number of marked subjects. Indeed, a resource with many access rights
in the ACL will generate a bigger TCL than a resource that can be accessed by
fewer subjects.
4.3 Generation Mechanisms
After having described both ACL and TCL, we now discuss the generation
mechanisms that aim at transforming existing ACL into TCLs. This subsection
presents the main parts of the generation mechanism.
Creation of the TCL structure To create the general structure of the TCLs,
the mechanism starts by retrieving all resources of the ACL. For each resource,
the mechanism retrieves every marked subjects. Then, the mechanism creates
the general structure of the matrices (one matrix per resource) by adding for
each row and column the marked subjects as senders and receivers.
Mapping Rules Concept Once the TCLs have been generated, they must
be filled. A naive approach could be to fill every intersection with TRANSMIS-
SION AUTH, because every subject in a specific TCL is a marked subject and
thus, has access to the resource in the original AC (see Fig. 3). Nevertheless,
9Fig. 3. Illustration of the creation of TCLs structure. For every resource in the ACL, a
corresponding TCL is created. The size of the TCL depends on the number of marked
subjects. Moreover, each marked subject is both sender and receiver.
allowing every single transmission between marked subjects can be too permis-
sive. In order to restrict transmissions in certain cases, we have defined Mapping
Rules (MR). A MR can be represented as a function that takes parameters of a
sender, actions, receiver and resource and returns a transmission type (13).
f(sender, senderAction, receiver, receiverAction, resource)→ type
type ∈ TransmissionType (13)
For each element of the matrix (i.e. each row/column intersection), the mech-
anism retrieves all the parameters concerning the sender, the receiver, the action
of the sender, the action of the receiver and the resource, then output a trans-
mission type.
To define how the transmission type is chosen depending on the entry parame-
ters, we have defined a syntax. Details about this syntax are given below.
Mapping Rules Syntax We have defined a syntax called Mapping Rules
Syntax (MRS). MRS is based of three different things: targets, operators and
inputs. A target can be formalized as an entity and an element (14). An entity
can be a sender, a receiver, an action of the sender, an action of the receiver or a
resource (15). An element can be an entity identifier (ex: ”John”), a parameter
key (ex: ”role”), or a parameter value (ex: ”manager”)(16).
target = (entity, element) (14)
entity = {sender, receiver, senderAction, receiverAction, resource} (15)
element = {identifier, parameter(key), parameter(value)} (16)
MRS uses two types of operators: arithmetic operators and logical operators
(17):
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arithmeticOperator : {=, 6=, <,>,≥,≤}
logicalOperator : {∨,∧} (17)
Finally, the last component of MRS is the input, which is just a String (i.e.
any word in the alphabet A) (18).
input ∈ A∗ (18)
Generic Rules Thanks to previous definitions, generic rules can be defined and
applied. A generic rule is defined by a target, an arithmetic operator, another
target and a transmission type (19):
genericRule = targetA, arithmeticOperator, targetB → type
targetA, targetB ∈ Target
type ∈ TransmissionType
(19)
Generic rules can provide predefined and generic patterns to security experts.
For instance, a generic rule such as ”you cannot send any resource to someone
with an accreditation level lower than yours” can be defined. Considering that
subjects have a parameter ”level” describing such accreditations, the previous
generic rule will be:
rule1: (sender, level) > (receiver, level) → TRANSMISSION DEN
With this formalism, we aim at providing general patterns that can be auto-
matically applied to every row/column intersection. Such mechanism can then
easily transform ACLs into TCLs.
Nevertheless, a security expert might want to define particular rules, adapted to
her/his business or infrastructure. To do so, we have defined specific rules.
Specific rules Our model defines a specific rule as a target, an arithmetic
operator and an input (20):
specificRule = target, arithmeticOperator, input→ type (20)
Specific rules are used to define specific conditions on parameter values. A
specific rule such as ”if the receiver does not have read and write permission, the
transmission is denied” will be defined by:
rule2:
(receiverAction,identifier) 6= ”Read-write” → TRANSMISSION DEN
To express even more complex rules, conditions and rules can be combined
with logical operators. For instance, a set of conditions can be used to define
the rule ”if John sends docA.pdf to a manager, the transmission is authorized”.
This rule will be formalized as follows:
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rule3:
(sender, identifier) = ”John” ∧ (resource, identifier) = ”docA.pdf” ∧
(receiver, identifier) = ”manager” → TRANSMISSION AUTH
Thanks to generic and specific rules, conditions on entities and parameters
can be defined and applied. Generic rules provide a toolkit that can automati-
cally be applied while specific rules formalism can be used by a security expert
to express specific conditions, depending on her/his infrastructure and security
concerns.
Confidential transmission Because TRANSMISSION AUTH does not mod-
ify the medium, we empathize that sending a resource in cleartext is not secured
and can be viewed as sending a resource to everyone. Thus, we have added
another type of transmission, called TRANSMISSION CONF, which allows a
security expert to express confidentiality. This transmission type can be used
with generic or specific rules. For instance, the rule ”resource ’docX.pdf’ needs
to be sent with confidentiality” will be expressed as follows:
rule4: (resource, identifier) = ”docX.pdf” → TRANSMISSION CONF
Conflict detection Our model is able to express generic and specific rules. Nev-
ertheless, definition and combinaison of these rules can lead to conflicts. Indeed,
imagine for instance that a security expert defines and combines two different
rules r1 and r2, where r1 defines ”When managers are sending a resource, the
transmission must have confidentiality property” and r2 defines ”John cannot
send docA.pdf” (even if he has access to it in the ACL). Imagine now that John
is a manager. The mapping mechanism will have issues deciding which transmis-
sion type to apply for every element in the row ”John” for the TCL of docA.pdf.
Indeed, for this resource, the system will not be able to determine if the resource
can be sent (r1) or not (r2). To overcome this issue, we have defined several
mechanisms.
The first one is to notify the security expert of the inconsistency and ask her/him
for an answer. She/he can chose the transmission type of her/his choice, or im-
plement an ad hoc rule.
To avoid multiple notifications, another mechanism that we have defined is
the decision strategies (DS). To use decision strategies, a security expert first
needs to set levels for transmission type. For our example, we have considered
that a denied transmission is more secure than the other types of transmission.
Thus, we have chosen the following order:
Level 1: TRANSMISSION AUTH < Level 2 : TRANSMISSION CONF <
Level 3: TRANSMISSION DEN
Once the levels have been defined, the security expert can use one of the
following decision strategies:
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– HIGHEST: apply the transmission type with the highest level
– LOWEST: apply the transmission type with the lowest level
– MOST PRESENT: apply the transmission type which is the most present in
the sequence of rules
– DEFAULT: apply the default transmission type
In our example, the following rule will be applied automatically, depending
on the strategy:
Strategy Applied rule
HIGHEST r2
LOWEST r1
MOST PRESENT cannot answer, DEFAULT is applied
DEFAULT TRANSMISSION DEN
To transform AC policies into TC policies, we have defined a specific syntax,
called Mapping Rules Syntax (MRS). MRS can express generic and specific
rules. Generic rules provide a toolkit that applies generic security policies while
Specific rules can be use to define ad hoc rules. Thanks to this syntax, an ACL
(which can be represented as a two-dimensional matrix) can be transformed
into many TCLs matrices. Each TCL represents all the transmissions marked
subjects can/cannot do for a specific resource.
4.4 Inference mechanisms to enhance existing AC policies (M1)
One of our objective is to provide a solution that is capable of improving an
existing AC model. To do so, we use inference mechanisms. This subsection
presents the main inferences that our solution is able to make.
Similarities between subjects In the same TCL, if two couples of row/column
are identical, it means that for a particular resource, two subjects have the same
transmission behavior (i.e. they can send and receive the resource in the same
way). If this reasoning is generalized for all TCLs, it means that these two sub-
jects have exactly the same transmission rights for all the resources they have
been marked for. Such inference mechanism is able to notify security experts
that two or more subjects are similar in terms of transmission rights.
The model is also able to determine if these similar subjects have common pa-
rameters (such as ”role” or ”group”). If the existing ACL is based on RBAC
or ABAC, the exact original classification is detected. However, if the original
AC was a model without roles or attributes, notifications can help a security
expert to have a better understanding of her/his ACL. With this knowledge,
the security expert can decide to migrate her/his original ACL to a RBAC or
ABAC model, using the notification to create roles or categories. Fig. 4. gives
an example of the similarities between subjects.
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Fig. 4. Representation of the subject similarities mechanism for a single resource. In
this case, security expert will be notified that Bob and Franck have the same behavior.
Similarities between resources The same inferences can be applied to re-
sources. In this case, if two TCLs are strictly equivalent, it means that for two
different resources, the same subjects have strictly the same transmission behav-
ior. The same assumption can be made for more than two resources. Thus, the
same reasoning as subject similarities can be applied, meaning that the model
is able to determine if similar resources (in term of transmission behavior) have
properties in common (for instance, type=”pdf”). Once again, these notifications
can help security experts to have a better understanding of the original AC.
4.5 Inference mechanisms to help integration and enhance security
knowledge (M2)
Inference mechanisms can also be used to detect security indulgences between
two infrastructures regarding the same resources. Indeed, imagine that a com-
pany A wants to buy another company B. Both companies can be very different
in terms of hierarchy, policies and sensibilities toward security. After the buyout,
security experts from company A might have some issues equalizing the two en-
vironments. Our solution can be interesting in such case.
Indeed, imagine that documentX.pdf is both used by company A and B. By
applying our model in both companies, two different TCLs, TCL A and TCL B,
will be generated. TCL A (resp. TCL B) will represent the transmission behavior
of documentX.pdf inside company A (resp. company B). Inferences mechanisms
presented previously cannot be applied, mainly because the two companies do
not share the same subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to compare the ”tenden-
cies” of the two TCLs. By tendencies, we mean general statistics such as the total
number of subjects who have access to the resource (i.e. the size of the TCL)
or the transmission types distribution (i.e. the percentage of each transmission
type). To give an example, Fig. 5. represents TCL A as a small matrix filled
with confidential transmissions, while TCL B is represented as a very big TCL
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with a lot of non-confidential transmissions. Tendencies underline that there is
a difference of security level regarding documentX.pdf. With such comparison,
our model is able to notify security experts that company B has an indulgent
security policy concerning documentX.pdf. Security experts can then modify
mapping rules to generate a less permissive TCL B, or tackle the problem at its
root and modify the AC of company B in order to reduce the size of TCL B.
Fig. 5. Illustration of the tendency inferences, applied to a buyout example. Based
on tendencies, notification can underline that company B is more indulgent regarding
documentX.pdf security.
5 Evaluations
This section presents the results of several tests conducted in order to show that
the proposed solution can be applied in real-life scenarios. For these tests, we
aim to answer the following three questions:
– Q1: Are generation and inference mechanisms time-consuming?
– Q2: Is our solution suitable for small and medium-sized companies?
– Q3: Do specific ACL characteristics have any effects on the computational
time?
5.1 Implementation
To generate ACLs, we have implemented an automatic rules generator. For the
tests, several ACLs have been generated in order to simulate small and medium-
sized company in term of subjects and resources. Information about these ACLs
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are given in Table 1. The last column of this table (Ratio) is the proportion
between the number of subjects and the number of resources (Ratio = NbRe-
sources/NbSubjects). A ratio greater than 1 is more likely to be found in a com-
pany. Indeed, the total amount of resources is often bigger than the total amount
of subjects. We have based our sets on this assumption and have generated ACLs
with different size and ratio. These ACLs try to simulate the amount of subjects
and resources that can be found in small and middle-sized companies. We em-
pathize, however, that these ACLs are purely speculative. Future works will focus
on asking companies for insight about realistic volumetry and ratios (to that end,
an online survey can be found here: http://goo.gl/forms/l0VIKDYBGt).
From a technical point of view, we have used a MacBook Pro Retina (Intel Core
i7, 2,4 GHz, 16GB RAM, 256 GB SSD hard drive) and Java 7. Java Virtual
Machine has been tweaked with a heap size of 4096 bytes.
We have used two mapping rules. The first one was ”you cannot send a resource
to someone with a lower accreditation level than you” while the second was:
”confidential resources need to be sent with confidentiality property”. Thus, we
have created subjects with a parameter ”accreditationLevel” and resources with
a parameter ”securityLevel”. In order not to distort results with human inter-
actions, we have used Decision Strategy ”STRONGEST” with the security level
described in 4.3. Thus, in case of conflict, the first rule was applied automatically.
5.2 Generation tests
In these tests, we have measured the time-consumption of the process that allows
our model to generate TCLs based on ACL. To do so, we have measured the
time between the loading operation of an ACL and the end of the process (i.e.
when all TCLs have been generated and saved as serializable objects in the hard
drive). Results in Fig. 6.A show the generation process results. For very little set
such as ACL1, it takes less than 1 second to compute. For sets ACL2 / ACL3 and
ACL4 / ACL5, we can notice that the ratio slightly influences the computation.
It can be explained by the fact that for ACL4, the maximum size of a TCL
would be 1000 rows and columns (if everyone has access to the corresponding
resource), whereas the maximum size of a TCL generated with ACL5 would
ID Rules Subjects Actions Resources Ratio
ACL1 50 10 3 40 4
ACL2 1500 250 3 1000 4
ACL3 1500 50 3 1250 25
ACL4 5000 1000 3 4000 4
ACL5 5000 200 3 4000 20
ACL6 10000 200 3 7000 35
Table 1. Access Control Lists used for the tests.
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Fig. 6. Results for the generation process tests (A), subjects similarities tests (B) and
resources similarities tests (C).
be ”only” 200. Thus, these results show that it is algorithmically easier to do
operations on a lot of smaller TCLs, rather than manipulating fewer, but bigger
ones. Moreover, the saving process that consists of storing the generated TCLs
is quite time-consuming, especially for big serialized objects.
Finally, ACL6 results show that our model can compute medium-size companies
sets in less than 2 minutes. We consider these results has acceptable, especially
for a process that needs to be done several times a day to be up-to-date.
5.3 Inferences tests
We have tested the subjects and resources inferences mechanisms. Results in fig-
ure 6.B show that the subjects similarities computational time depends on the
size of the ACL, with no significant impact regarding the ratio. Results in figure
6.C, however, show that ratio has a little impact for resource similarities. Indeed,
even if ACL4 has 400 more resources, results shows that resources similarities
process in ACL4 is faster than in ACL3. This results can be explained by the
fact that once again, it is easier to compare many smaller Java objects.
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Thanks to the conducted tests, questions Q1, Q2 and Q3 have been answered.
Results show that the mechanisms involved in our model (i.e. generation and
inferences) are quite fast, even with ACLs that embeds hundred of subjects
and thousands of resources (Q1). Despite the fact that these ACLs generate
thousands of TCLs, results have shown that our model is scalable and can be
used for small and medium-size companies volumetry (Q2). Finally, tests have
shown that ratio between subjects and resources can have an impact on the
processing time (Q3). Indeed, bigger ratio reduces the computational time for
some mechanisms. Fortunately, this kind of ratio is more likely to be found in a
real life scenario.
6 Conclusion
Over the years, Access Control (AC) mechanisms have been proposed to con-
trol access of resources. Unfortunately, traditional AC do not provide notification
mechanisms when a resource is retransmitted to an unauthorized third party. To
overcome this issue, Data Loss/Leak Prevention or other Transmission Control
(TC) mechanisms can be implemented on top of AC. Nevertheless, TC policies
can contradict existing AC policies, leading to potential data leaks. One solu-
tion can be to link both paradigms in a common formalism, allowing a security
expert to define both policies at the same time. Nevertheless, proposed solutions
do not always provide TC rules that are compliant with existing AC policies.
Moreover, they do not offer notification mechanisms that can help enhancing
the existing AC policies and facilitate the integration between companies and
infrastructures. To cover these drawbacks, we have defined a new transformation
mechanism that takes existing AC policies and generates TC policies. Thanks to
the generated TC policies, two notification mechanisms have been implemented.
The first mechanism can help enhancing the existing AC (M1). This mecha-
nism has been implemented thanks to resources and subjects similarities fea-
tures. Such features can help a security expert to have a better understanding
of her/his existing AC, by detecting resources and subjects with the same trans-
mission behavior (Section 4.4). The second mechanism can be used to ease the
integration between infrastructure and increase security knowledge (M2). Once
again, we have used generated TCLs to infer tendencies that fulfill such purpose.
To give an example, we have proposed a simple case study of a company buyout
(Section 4.5). Finally, we have tested our solution with various ACLs. Results
show that the model is interesting in terms of computational time for small and
medium-sized companies.
In the future, we intend to modify our model to take into account more so-
phisticated entities by using capability-based security. Moreover, we will aim at
reasoning with clusters of entities rather than single entities to simplify policy
management and reduce the number of generated files. Secondly, we aim at creat-
ing realistic ACLs (in term of subjects and resources ratio) by asking companies
about the volumetry of their ACLs. Finally, we would like to offer a formalized
approach of the complexity of our mechanisms.
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